banner

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes Python and Node.js scripts (e.g., gemini_batch_process.py and screenshot.js) using subprocess calls. These commands interpolate user-controlled variables such as campaign names, style keywords, and prompt descriptions directly into shell arguments, creating a surface for command injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow includes a research step where the agent navigates to pinterest.com to collect design references and screenshots. This introduces external, untrusted content into the agent's environment and subsequent processing steps.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of external data and user input. Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via Pinterest research results and user-supplied banner content (headlines, text). Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to isolate or ignore malicious instructions that might be embedded in the design content or user inputs. Capability inventory: The agent can execute local scripts, perform file system operations (writes to the assets directory), and browse the web. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input strings before they are used to generate prompts or script arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 08:41 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — banner