continuous-learning-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). The background 'observer' agent processes session logs (
observations.jsonl) containing untrusted tool outputs and user prompts to generate behavioral rules ('instincts'). - Ingestion points: Tool inputs, tool outputs, and user prompts are logged to
observations.jsonland subsequently read by a background Claude Haiku agent. - Boundary markers: The system prompt for the background observer (found in
observer-loop.sh) provides instructions but does not employ robust delimiters to separate the untrusted log data from its internal instructions. - Capability inventory: The background agent is explicitly granted the
Writetool to create or update instinct files in~/.claude/homunculus/. These instincts directly influence the primary agent's future behavior. - Sanitization: The skill includes a regex-based secret scrubber in
observe.shto redact API keys and tokens from logs, providing some defense against data exposure, but it does not sanitize against instructional content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
instinct-cli.pyscript includes acmd_importfunction that allows users to fetch instinct definitions from arbitrary URLs usingurllib.request.urlopen. While triggered by a CLI command, this allows the introduction of external behavioral instructions into the agent's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on shell scripts (
observe.sh,start-observer.sh,observer-loop.sh) and Python'ssubprocessmodule to manage background processes, project detection, and file system operations. While these are used for the skill's core functionality, they represent a broad execution surface.
Audit Metadata