regex-vs-llm-structured-text

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a pattern where untrusted input text is interpolated directly into an LLM prompt for validation, which is a classic indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the content parameter in the process_document function and is passed as original_text to validate_with_llm.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt template f"Text: {original_text}\n\n..." lacks isolation markers (like XML tags or clear delimiters) or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the text.
  • Capability inventory: The code snippets demonstrate LLM invocation using an SDK client; no subprocess calls, file writing, or network operations are present.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the input text before it is interpolated into the prompt.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 02:58 PM