browser-qa
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data to define its testing scope and behavior, creating a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in data sources.
- Ingestion points: In SKILL.md, Step 2 fetches data from issue trackers and commit messages. Step 3 involves interacting with a running application and reading a 'dogfood' workflow template.
- Boundary markers: There are no specified delimiters or instructions for the agent to distinguish between data and instructions when reading commit messages or issue descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The skill invokes other powerful tools (
runandagent-browser) and executes shell commands to retrieve testing templates. - Sanitization: The instructions do not include steps to sanitize, escape, or validate the content retrieved from external issue trackers or the application's runtime state before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata