finish
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which influences its code modification and triage logic.
- Ingestion points: Reads issue references in commit messages, open pull request descriptions, and specification files located in
docs/,specs/, or.scratch/directories (Step 1). It also processes the results of findings from sub-agents (Step 2). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious directions embedded within the ingested specification files or PR descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to modify local code via clustered sub-agents, commit those changes using the
/committool (Step 4), and open or refresh pull requests through/open-pr(Step 6). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the data gathered from project history or documentation before it is passed to the sub-agents for execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several external tools and sub-skills to perform automated operations.
- Evidence: The workflow involves calls to
/code-review,/mattpocock-skills:code-review,/browser-qa,/interview-me,/commit,/simplify, and/open-prto process findings and apply fixes.
Audit Metadata