ship-it
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from pull request bodies, comments, and external documentation to make a merge decision, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Step 2) andreferences/judge.md(The spec section) specify that the agent gathers evidence from the PR's body, comments, review ledgers, QA verdicts, and linked tracker issues/docs. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the sub-agent judge to treat the ingested evidence as untrusted data or to ignore instructions contained within that data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to merge pull requests into the repository (
SKILL.mdStep 4). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the gathered evidence before it is passed to the sub-agent judge.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions for the sub-agent judge in
references/judge.mddirect the use of command-line tools such asghand other unspecified CLIs to verify preconditions for the merge.
Audit Metadata