showcase
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources to generate a structured brief for a downstream agent.
- Ingestion points: Processes user-provided PR links, issue links, and session context (Step 1), as well as outputs from research tools like
/howand/why(Step 3). - Boundary markers: The skill creates a structured Markdown brief to hand over to the
/to-artifacttool, but does not include explicit instructions to the downstream agent to disregard potentially malicious instructions embedded within the gathered descriptions or research data. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute code via
/run, write capture files to the disk, and dispatch new agents with specific contexts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the content gathered from research tools or external links before it is interpolated into the final brief.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses platform tools to interact with and execute project-related code.
- Evidence: Step 3 instructions require the agent to 'Invoke
/runto get the app serving, then drive the flow from that URL' to generate visual captures. This utilizes the platform's capability to execute the local application environment.
Audit Metadata