ideogram4
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a natural language expander, transforming user requests into structured JSON. This establishes a processing pipeline where instructions from a user could theoretically influence the generated output or the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Natural language asks from users are processed in
examples.mdandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the user's "casual ask."
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes a local CLI tool (
tools/ideogram4.py) and reads local JSON files (brands/<brand>/brand.json). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of user-supplied text strings is mentioned before they are placed into the JSON schema's
textordescfields. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a local wrapper tool (
tools/ideogram4.py) using theuv runcommand. While this is standard for local tool integration, it involves the execution of shell commands with parameters generated from user-influenced data. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Documentation in
examples.mdguides the agent to read brand-specific configuration files using a path constructed from a user-supplied brand name (brands/<brand>/brand.json). This pattern creates a potential path traversal surface if a user provides a malicious brand string containing directory traversal characters (e.g.,../../), although the risk is limited by the context of a documentation example rather than a script vulnerability.
Audit Metadata