vision-tools
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted image data via OCR and vision tools, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in images could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Image files are ingested and processed by multiple tools, including
glance,detect,ground, and thelong_screenshot_ocr.pyscript. - Boundary markers: The prompt logic in
long_screenshot_ocr.pyincludes instructions to the vision model to avoid summarization or inference ("Do not summarize, rewrite, translate, or infer clipped text"), providing some protection against accidental instruction following. - Capability inventory: The skill environment supports subprocess execution (launching a browser via
html_shot.pyand theglanceCLI vialong_screenshot_ocr.py) and filesystem access for reading and writing image artifacts and transcripts. - Sanitization: Extracted OCR text is merged into markdown or JSON files without specific sanitization or escaping of the content found within the source images.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes subprocesses to perform its core functions, such as capturing screenshots and calling vision utilities.
- Evidence: The script
scripts/html_shot.pyusessubprocess.Popenandsubprocess.runto launch and control a Chrome-family browser (Chrome, Chromium, or Edge) in headless mode for rendering HTML. - Evidence: The script
scripts/long_screenshot_ocr.pyusessubprocess.runto execute theglancevision CLI, resolving the executable path via the systemPATHor relative repository locations. - Context: These executions are documented parts of the skill's intended functionality and are used to provide visual capabilities to the agent.
Audit Metadata