vision-tools

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted image data via OCR and vision tools, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in images could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Image files are ingested and processed by multiple tools, including glance, detect, ground, and the long_screenshot_ocr.py script.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt logic in long_screenshot_ocr.py includes instructions to the vision model to avoid summarization or inference ("Do not summarize, rewrite, translate, or infer clipped text"), providing some protection against accidental instruction following.
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment supports subprocess execution (launching a browser via html_shot.py and the glance CLI via long_screenshot_ocr.py) and filesystem access for reading and writing image artifacts and transcripts.
  • Sanitization: Extracted OCR text is merged into markdown or JSON files without specific sanitization or escaping of the content found within the source images.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes subprocesses to perform its core functions, such as capturing screenshots and calling vision utilities.
  • Evidence: The script scripts/html_shot.py uses subprocess.Popen and subprocess.run to launch and control a Chrome-family browser (Chrome, Chromium, or Edge) in headless mode for rendering HTML.
  • Evidence: The script scripts/long_screenshot_ocr.py uses subprocess.run to execute the glance vision CLI, resolving the executable path via the system PATH or relative repository locations.
  • Context: These executions are documented parts of the skill's intended functionality and are used to provide visual capabilities to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 17, 2026, 09:22 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — vision-tools