recall
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to use several CLI tools to verify the state of the workspace and process history logs.
- Evidence: Mentions of
ls -tandgrepfor searching transcripts, and the use ofgitandghfor verifying PRs and branches inSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external, potentially attacker-controlled sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads from chat transcripts, source control records, issue trackers, chat/issue channels, documentation, and error tracking systems as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions include a requirement to "sanitize private context before any public output" and to use a specific "unslop" tool for final output formatting.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system tools (
ls,grep), version control tools (git,gh), and the ability to spawn parallel subagents to process large volumes of data. - Sanitization: While the skill mentions sanitization of private context, there are no explicit instructions for handling or escaping untrusted natural language instructions embedded within the ingested data.
Audit Metadata