orca-subagents

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates a workflow where subagents process the local workspace using the --worktree current flag and return results via temporary files in /tmp. This establishes a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the subagents process malicious content from the repository, which is then passed back to the main agent context through the --report-path mechanism.
  • Ingestion points: The main agent reads report files generated by subagents from /tmp. Subagents ingest data from the local repository as part of their assigned tasks.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or safety instructions for the agent to distinguish between its own logic and potentially malicious content within these reports.
  • Capability inventory: The skill interacts with multiple external CLI tools (orca, claude, codex, grok, cursor-agent) and executes shell scripts.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the subagent's report content is mentioned before it is processed by the calling agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/reachable shell script performs automated status checks by executing external CLI binaries including claude, codex, grok, and cursor-agent. These executions are limited to status and authentication checks of established tools and use safe quoting for the command names.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill refers to the command orca skills get orchestration to fetch additional skill modules from the vendor's ecosystem. This is a standard mechanism for fetching external content within the tool's framework.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 16, 2026, 02:08 PM