skills/anortham/razorback/codex-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

codex-cli

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell scripts to extract repository information (git diffs, branch bases). These scripts interpolate variables such as $USER_BASE and $DIR directly into command lines, creating a potential shell injection surface if these variables are influenced by untrusted project metadata.
  • Evidence: Shell logic in the 'Review Targeting' section of SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions encourage the use of the --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox flag for specific tasks, which disables essential security boundaries and user approval workflows.
  • Evidence: Usage recommendations in the 'Sandbox mode' and 'Delegate a Task' sections of SKILL.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs the Codex CLI tool from OpenAI's official NPM registry.
  • Evidence: Installation command 'npm install -g @openai/codex' provided in the 'Error Handling' section of SKILL.md.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits project-specific code diffs and file contents to external AI models for analysis, which is inherent to its functionality but represents a sensitive data transfer.
  • Evidence: Invocations of codex exec that process diffs and project files throughout the skill.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted diffs and logs from the current repository and feeds them to a model with the ability to modify the workspace.
  • Mandatory Evidence Chain:
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md processes output from git diff and git log.
  • Boundary markers: Uses structured headers and an 'Adversarial Prompt Template' to encapsulate user and repository data.
  • Capability inventory: The codex exec tool has file system write access (--full-auto) and arbitrary command execution capabilities.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented logic for escaping or sanitizing the content of the diffs or logs before they are passed to the external model.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 03:01 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — codex-cli