receiving-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements strict behavioral constraints that override standard AI conversational patterns, specifically banning polite acknowledgments and expressions of gratitude (e.g., "You're absolutely right!", "Great point!"). It also establishes a specific signal phrase ("Strange things are afoot at the Circle K") for the agent to use if it feels unable to technically push back against feedback.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to utilize specific tools and APIs to verify feedback, including
gh apifor interacting with GitHub Pull Request comments and internal tools likedeep_dive(symbol)andfast_refs(symbol)for codebase exploration. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the skill does not explicitly exfiltrate data, its reliance on
gh apiand interactions with external reviewers provides a potential path for data flow to external platforms if the agent is manipulated via the review feedback. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is intended to process "External Reviewer" feedback, which is an untrusted external data source that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during implementation.
- Ingestion points: External review feedback received via GitHub or other review platforms (referenced in SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define structural delimiters for the external feedback but relies on a multi-step "Response Pattern" (Read, Understand, Verify, Evaluate) to mitigate risks.
- Capability inventory: Access to GitHub API (
gh api), code analysis tools (deep_dive,fast_refs), and the ability to modify the codebase. - Sanitization: Relies on manual technical verification against the existing codebase and "architecture-quality" checks rather than automated input sanitization.
Audit Metadata