subagent-driven-development
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill's core workflow involves extracting task descriptions from external files (documented in
SKILL.mdStep 1) and passing them as instructions to implementer subagents. - Ingestion points: Implementation plans are read from the repository (e.g.,
docs/plans/feature-plan.md) and treated as authoritative specifications. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates in
implementer-prompt.md,fix-prompt.md, andspec-reviewer-prompt.mdlack explicit delimiters (like XML tags) or instructions to disregard malicious prompts embedded within the interpolated task text. - Capability inventory: Dispatched subagents have extensive capabilities, including creating/modifying files, running shell commands (TDD), and committing changes to the repository via tools such as
Agent,Task,spawn_agent, andinvoke_agent. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement validation or sanitization of plan content before it is used to generate prompts for subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Delegated Command Ownership. The skill framework assigns verification scopes (
worker-red-green,worker-ceiling) to subagents, who are then responsible for executing repository-defined commands. While intended for testing and validation, these capabilities could be exploited if a subagent is compromised via the indirect injection surface mentioned above.
Audit Metadata