subagent-driven-development

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill's core workflow involves extracting task descriptions from external files (documented in SKILL.md Step 1) and passing them as instructions to implementer subagents.
  • Ingestion points: Implementation plans are read from the repository (e.g., docs/plans/feature-plan.md) and treated as authoritative specifications.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates in implementer-prompt.md, fix-prompt.md, and spec-reviewer-prompt.md lack explicit delimiters (like XML tags) or instructions to disregard malicious prompts embedded within the interpolated task text.
  • Capability inventory: Dispatched subagents have extensive capabilities, including creating/modifying files, running shell commands (TDD), and committing changes to the repository via tools such as Agent, Task, spawn_agent, and invoke_agent.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not implement validation or sanitization of plan content before it is used to generate prompts for subagents.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Delegated Command Ownership. The skill framework assigns verification scopes (worker-red-green, worker-ceiling) to subagents, who are then responsible for executing repository-defined commands. While intended for testing and validation, these capabilities could be exploited if a subagent is compromised via the indirect injection surface mentioned above.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 03:01 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — subagent-driven-development