browser-mcp-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables an agent to browse the open web and ingest content via
get_content,screenshot, andevaluatetools. This introduces a surface where malicious third-party content (e.g., hidden instructions in a webpage) could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
get_content,screenshot,evaluate(inSKILL.md) - Boundary markers: None detected in the skill logic; the documentation advises users to treat page text as data, not instruction.
- Capability inventory:
navigate,click,fill,evaluate,launch_browser(inSKILL.md) - Sanitization: None; the skill relies on the model's ability to distinguish external content from system instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
anti-detect-browser(NPM) orantibrow(PyPI) packages. Upon first execution, these packages download a closed-source browser kernel binary (approximately 190MB to 320MB) from the vendor's CDN atantibrow.com. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
evaluatetool provides the capability to execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the context of the active browser page. While intended for automation, this is a high-privilege function that could be abused if the agent is misled by malicious page content. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
start_live_viewtool generates a shareable URL that streams the browser's screen. If used during a logged-in session, this URL could expose sensitive user data or session cookies if the link is accessed by unauthorized parties. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of JavaScript in the browser (
evaluate) and relies on a dynamically downloaded binary kernel to perform its core spoofing functions.
Audit Metadata