handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to gather environment data and capture project state. Specifically, it uses
gitto retrieve branch information, status, and full diffs of the working tree. It also attempts to execute an external binary namedspecweaveif it is present on the system's PATH, passing user-provided strings as command-line arguments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a handoff document that is explicitly intended to be consumed by another AI agent as "ground truth." This creates an attack surface where malicious content within the repository (captured via
git diff) or user-supplied inputs could influence the behavior of the receiving agent. - Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from
git diff,git status, and multiple user-provided interview fields such asreason,summary,next,gotcha, anddecisions(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The output uses markdown headers and specific blocks like
BEGIN HANDOFFandEND HANDOFFto delimit the content, but lacks instructions for the receiving agent to treat the embedded data as non-executable (SKILL.md). - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
git,sed,mkdir,printf) and invoke an external engine (specweave) (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: A heuristic secret scrubber using
sedand regex patterns is implemented to mask common API keys and tokens, but no sanitization is performed to prevent prompt injection or markdown breaking within the interpolated fields (SKILL.md). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill captures the full output of
git diff HEADandgit diff --cachedinto a file located at.handoff/handoff.diff. Although a regex-based scrubber is applied, the capture of uncommitted changes poses a risk of exposing sensitive data, environment variables, or hardcoded secrets if they are not caught by the heuristic patterns.
Audit Metadata