higgsfield-seedance
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run the command
python3 seedance_lint.py "<prompt text>"to validate user input. This pattern directly interpolates unvalidated user-supplied strings into a shell command, which allows for command injection if the user provides characters like;,&, or|to execute arbitrary code. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to execute external scripts, specifically
seedance_lint.pyandhiggsfield_memory.py, which are expected to exist at the project root. Executing local scripts that process user-controlled input at runtime introduces a dynamic execution risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A central component of the skill is a 'Rewrite Playbook' and 'Voice Rewrite' guide specifically designed to bypass AI content filters. The instructions provide strategies to circumvent safety guardrails by substituting restricted terms (violence, brands, public figures) with descriptive archetypes that the filter might not detect.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data (user-generated scene descriptions) and pass it to execution environments. The instructions lack adequate boundary markers or sanitization logic for handling this external content.
- Ingestion points: User-provided scene descriptions and failure reports processed in the 'Detailed Description' and 'Pre-flight Linter' sections.
- Boundary markers: None identified. User input is directly interpolated into commands and prompt structures.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
python3for linting and memory logging (specified inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of user-supplied text is described before its use in shell execution or prompt construction.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata