agent-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
codexandclaudeCLI tools to delegate work between different agents. This activity is the core intended purpose of the skill and is governed by explicit user-defined arguments and script-level safety checks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it facilitates the execution of user-supplied instructions on a peer AI agent.
- Ingestion points: The
PROMPT_FILEargument passed toagent-delegate.shacts as the primary ingestion point for untrusted instructions. - Boundary markers: While
reviewmode utilizes theadversarial-review-prompt.mdtemplate to provide structure and instructions, thedelegatemode passes the prompt directly to the peer agent without additional boundary markers or delimiters. - Capability inventory: Across its scripts, the skill utilizes
codex exec,claude -p,git, and local file writing operations. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is performed on the contents of the prompt file before it is passed to the peer agent via stdin.
- This surface is integral to the skill's primary function of delegation and is managed within the host environment's security context.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script accesses local environment variables (e.g.,
CLAUDECODE,CODEX_HOME) and the~/.codex/config.tomlfile to resolve agent configurations and verify workspace trust levels. These operations are confined to local configuration resolution and do not involve unauthorized external network communication.
Audit Metadata