cmux-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
cmuxtool to manage terminal surfaces and execute shell commands. It usescmux sendto transmit instructions to sub-panes, providing the agent with broad terminal interaction capabilities. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to utilize safety-bypass flags such as
--dangerously-skip-permissionsfor Claude Code and--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxfor Codex. These flags are designed to disable standard AI safety filters and permission prompts, effectively granting child agents elevated, unmonitored access to the host system. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill supports a 'Custom Agent' feature where the command used to launch the child agent is derived from user input and executed in a shell environment via
cmux. This allows for the dynamic assembly and execution of shell commands based on instructional prompts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection through its monitoring and result collection functionality.
- Ingestion points: The parent agent reads terminal output from sub-panes using
cmux read-screen(Step 8,SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the sub-pane output as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities through
Bashandcmux, including terminal control and command execution. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or validation of the data collected from the child agent's terminal screen, meaning malicious content produced by a child agent could potentially manipulate the parent agent's next steps.
Audit Metadata