spec-implement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub issues and local project documentation to drive the implementation workflow.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads external content via
gh issue view(Phase 4) and scans markdown files in the.specs/directory (Phase 6). - Boundary markers: The orchestrator uses structured prompt templates and role definitions to separate worker instructions from the provided data, though it does not implement explicit sanitization for the issue content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify the file system, execute shell commands, manage Git branches, and interact with GitHub APIs through the CLI.
- Sanitization: No explicit filtering or escaping of the GitHub issue body is performed before it is interpolated into sub-agent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a variety of shell commands and CLI tools to manage the repository and coordinate agents.
- Evidence: Utilizes
gitfor feature branch management andghfor retrieving issues and creating pull requests. - Evidence: Employs standard Linux utilities like
find,ls,grep,sed,yq, andawkfor navigating the file system and parsing configuration files. - Evidence: The skill invokes the
claudeandcodexCLIs within acmuxenvironment, employing automation flags such as--dangerously-skip-permissionsand--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxto bypass interactive prompts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The orchestrator relies on specialized worker skills and coordination scripts.
- Evidence: Delegates tasks to worker skills
spec-code,spec-review, andspec-test, which are part of theanyoneanderson/agent-skillsecosystem. - Evidence: Depends on a local script
agent-delegate.shto handle cross-AI task routing and peer review coordination.
Audit Metadata