land-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from pull request bodies, review comments, and CI logs to make merge decisions.
- Ingestion points: Fetches pull request data, review comments, and CI logs using
gh apiandgh run viewas described inSKILL.md(Steps 1, 2, and 3). - Boundary markers: The skill includes explicit instructions to only merge upon receiving a specific "owner's word" (e.g., "merge", "ship it") and to check for
AGENTS.mdprohibitions. - Capability inventory: The skill can merge pull requests (
gh pr merge) and resolve review threads via GraphQL mutations. - Sanitization: A "gate" mechanism is described in Step 6 to ensure the merge command is executed in isolation with strict shell options to prevent command injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses various command-line tools to interact with the repository and the GitHub API.
- Evidence: Frequent use of
gh api,gh api graphql,gh pr merge, andgit logthroughout the operational steps inSKILL.md. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses pull request metadata and build logs, which is a requirement for its primary functionality.
- Evidence: Accesses failing CI logs and PR comments to facilitate automated fixes and feedback loops.
Audit Metadata