airflow-translations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Command Execution Pattern]: The skill instructs the agent to run a command named
prekfor validation purposes. This appears to be a non-standard tool, as the official Apache Airflow project typically uses thepre-commitframework for these tasks. Executing unknown or non-standard binaries within the terminal can be a security consideration. - [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill is designed to read, scaffold, and translate JSON locale files from the project directory. Because these files are ingested into the agent's context to inform its behavior, there is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the source files are manipulated to include hidden instructions.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads existing JSON files from
airflow-core/src/airflow/ui/public/i18n/locales/to learn terminology and verify translation completeness. - Boundary markers: There are no specific boundary markers or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within the ingested translation files.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands including
mkdir,breeze, andprekto perform its tasks. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization process for the content read from external JSON files before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata