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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through GraphQL queries fetching Pull Request titles, labels, and bodies in
fetch.md. - Boundary markers: The skill includes an explicit instruction in
SKILL.mdto treat external content as data rather than instructions, acknowledging the risk of prompt injection attempts in PR titles. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
gh apifor data retrieval,gh gist createfor publishing reports, andpython3for setup checks acrossSKILL.md,fetch.md, andexport.md. - Sanitization: While the skill instructs the agent to flag injection attempts to the user, there is no evidence of programmatic sanitization or strict schema validation for the ingested strings.
- [Automated Network Communication]: As defined in
export.md, the skill is designed to automatically publish generated HTML dashboards to a secret GitHub Gist. This represents an automated outbound network operation that transmits data processed by the agent to a remote service, which is a standard part of this skill's dashboarding functionality. - [Local Command Execution]: The skill executes shell commands, including the GitHub CLI (
gh) andpython3modules, to perform GitHub API operations and project pre-flight checks. These executions are necessary for the skill's logic but involve standard command execution patterns. - [Configuration and State Access]: The skill reads and updates local state and configuration files, such as
.apache-magpie.lockand.apache-magpie.session-state.json. These actions are used for drift detection and to maintain a stable identifier for the published dashboard across sessions.
Audit Metadata