vote-tally
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill fetches external content such as mailing list bodies and GitHub comments to perform vote tallies. This content is untrusted and could potentially contain malicious instructions. The skill includes strong mitigations by explicitly instructing the agent to treat this content as data rather than instructions and to report any detected injection attempts in the
injection_summaryfield. - Ingestion points: Vote thread bodies from mail archives, GitHub Discussion replies, and PR review comments.
- Boundary markers: The skill provides clear instructions to treat external content as data and to ignore any embedded directives.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands using
gh(GitHub CLI) andpython3, and performs network read operations to fetch vote data. - Sanitization: The agent is instructed to manually flag and ignore injection attempts, though no automated sanitization script is invoked on the data itself.
- Command Execution: The skill executes local Python modules and CLI tools to perform its logic.
- Evidence: Use of
python3 -m setup_preflightfor project verification andgh apifor fetching GitHub discussion data. - External Data Fetching: The skill retrieves information from external services to aggregate vote signals.
- Evidence: Connection to Apache mailing list archives (via PonyMail templates) and GitHub APIs to read thread contents.
Audit Metadata