pptx
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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various external binaries via shell commands, including
soffice(LibreOffice),pdftoppm, andgitfor document processing and validation tasks. - Evidence found in
scripts/thumbnail.py,scripts/office/soffice.py, andscripts/office/validators/redlining.py. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a dynamic execution pattern by compiling C code at runtime and injecting it into a target process.
- In
scripts/office/soffice.py, a C shim is written to a temporary file, compiled withgcc, and loaded into thesofficeprocess via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to modify its socket handling behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and extracts data from untrusted PowerPoint presentations.
- Ingestion points: Slide XML files (
ppt/slides/*.xml) and layout files are read during the editing and analysis workflows described inSKILL.mdandediting.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore nested prompts are used when the agent processes extracted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for command execution (
scripts/thumbnail.py), runtime code compilation (scripts/office/soffice.py), and file system manipulation (scripts/office/pack.py). - Sanitization: Natural language content is not sanitized after extraction; however,
defusedxmlis correctly used to protect against XML-based attacks like XXE. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the installation of several well-known Python and Node.js packages from established registries.
- Fetches
markitdown,Pillow, andpptxgenjsfrom official package registries.
Audit Metadata