skills/apconw/aix-db/pptx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pptx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various external binaries via shell commands, including soffice (LibreOffice), pdftoppm, and git for document processing and validation tasks.
  • Evidence found in scripts/thumbnail.py, scripts/office/soffice.py, and scripts/office/validators/redlining.py.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a dynamic execution pattern by compiling C code at runtime and injecting it into a target process.
  • In scripts/office/soffice.py, a C shim is written to a temporary file, compiled with gcc, and loaded into the soffice process via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to modify its socket handling behavior.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and extracts data from untrusted PowerPoint presentations.
  • Ingestion points: Slide XML files (ppt/slides/*.xml) and layout files are read during the editing and analysis workflows described in SKILL.md and editing.md.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore nested prompts are used when the agent processes extracted text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for command execution (scripts/thumbnail.py), runtime code compilation (scripts/office/soffice.py), and file system manipulation (scripts/office/pack.py).
  • Sanitization: Natural language content is not sanitized after extraction; however, defusedxml is correctly used to protect against XML-based attacks like XXE.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the installation of several well-known Python and Node.js packages from established registries.
  • Fetches markitdown, Pillow, and pptxgenjs from official package registries.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 04:07 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pptx