xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyperforms runtime compilation of C source code into a shared object library usinggcc. This compiled library is subsequently injected into thesoffice(LibreOffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This technique is used to shim system calls to handle socket restrictions in sandboxed environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute several system binaries:sofficefor formula recalculation (scripts/recalc.py),gccfor compilation tasks (scripts/office/soffice.py), andgitfor comparing document content (scripts/office/validators/redlining.py). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted spreadsheet data combined with its command execution capabilities:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data from
.xlsx,.csv, and.tsvfiles enters the agent context throughpandas.read_excelandopenpyxl.load_workbookas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters defined to distinguish data content from instructions, nor are there warnings to the agent to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute arbitrary system commands via
subprocess.runcalls in multiple supporting scripts. - Sanitization: No evidence of content sanitization or validation is present before data interpolation or process invocation.
Audit Metadata