find-cohort-gap
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple sources which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's research gap analysis or output ranking.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/build_cohort_profile.pyscript reads local codebooks (.csv, .xlsx, .json, .md) and fetches content from user-provided context URLs. Furthermore, Phases 1, 3, and 4 utilize the/search-litskill to ingest PubMed abstracts and metadata. - Boundary markers: External context extracted by the script is wrapped in
# Context: [source]headers in thecontext_extract.mdfile. TheSKILL.mdincludes an 'Anti-Hallucination' section requiring verification of all clinical definitions and references. - Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash,Write,Edit,Read,Grep, andGlobtools. The bundled Python script usessubprocess.runto call system utilities. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of natural language instructions within the ingested documents or PubMed data is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/build_cohort_profile.pyscript executes thepdftotextsystem utility viasubprocess.runto extract text from PDF files. While the arguments are passed as a list (reducing shell injection risks), it constitutes a subprocess call on external, potentially untrusted files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/build_cohort_profile.pyscript performs network operations usingurllib.requestto fetch domain context from arbitrary URLs provided by the user. This is an intended feature for research but allows the agent to interact with external web servers.
Audit Metadata