search-lit

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The fallback utility script references/pubmed_eutils.sh constructs a Python command using shell interpolation of the ${query} and ${title} variables. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the input contains single quotes, which could allow the execution of arbitrary Python code within the agent's shell environment. Remediation: Pass variables as arguments to Python rather than interpolating them directly into the command string.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches scholarly metadata and preprints from well-known services including NCBI E-utilities (eutils.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov), CrossRef (api.crossref.org), Unpaywall (api.unpaywall.org), and OpenAlex (api.openalex.org).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to the processing of large volumes of external scholarly data. \n
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via PubMed, Semantic Scholar, and preprint server APIs through both MCP tools and the pubmed_eutils.sh script. \n
  • Boundary markers: While the skill documentation emphasizes verification protocols, it does not specify technical delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the literature content itself. \n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to Bash, Write, and Edit tools, which could be exploited if malicious instructions embedded in a paper's abstract are executed. \n
  • Sanitization: The scripts use standard JSON and XML parsers but do not sanitize text fields to detect or strip instructions hidden within scholarly abstracts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 5, 2026, 12:28 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — search-lit