finding-affiliate-marketers-on-social-media
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes a
customMapFunctionparameter described as a "JavaScript function to transform each output object." This allows for the execution of arbitrary code logic within the data processing pipeline. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to run shell commands using
node scripts/run_actor.jsandcurl. These commands involve sensitive operations like writing files to the local system (--output YYYY-MM-DD_results.csv) and making network requests. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions explicitly mention using the
APIFY_TOKENenvironment variable and providecurlcommands that send this sensitive credential toapi.apify.com. While this is intended for the service's functionality, it represents a pattern of transmitting credentials over the network. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external, untrusted sources (Instagram and TikTok via scrapers). There is a documented attack surface where malicious content embedded in social media posts could influence the agent's behavior during the classification and scoring steps (Step 3 and 4).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context from the Apify dataset items fetched via
curlorrun_actor.js. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions for the agent to distinguish between platform metadata and potential malicious content in social media bios or posts.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
nodeexecution,curlfor network requests, and file-writing capabilities. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or filtering of the scraped content before processing.
Audit Metadata