finding-brand-ambassador-candidates
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from Instagram and TikTok posts, including captions and metadata, which could contain adversarial instructions targeting the agent.
- Ingestion points: Scraped content from Instagram and TikTok via Apify actors.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the workflow or output instructions to separate untrusted data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Execution of local scripts via node, network requests via curl, and use of the apify:run-actor tool.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the scraped content before processing or presentation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands to interact with external services.
- Evidence: Shell command blocks in SKILL.md using
node scripts/run_actor.jsandcurlfor REST API fallback to the Apify platform. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external actors to perform data scraping.
- Evidence: References to
apidojo~instagram-scraperandapidojo~tiktok-scraperon the Apify platform. These are vendor-owned resources from 'apidojo-io' used for their primary purpose.
Audit Metadata