finding-restaurant-brands-on-instagram

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from Instagram profiles, hashtags, and locations, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Instagram data retrieved via the startUrls input parameter (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the scraped content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment supports shell command execution (node) and network requests (curl) to the Apify API (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the external data before it is integrated into the agent's context.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The customMapFunction parameter allows the user or agent to pass a JavaScript string to the Apify actor. Although this code executes on the remote Apify platform rather than the local agent environment, it creates a vector for remote code execution if the input is improperly handled.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides explicit instructions for the agent to execute shell commands using node to run local scripts and curl to perform HTTP POST requests to the Apify REST API.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references a script named scripts/run_actor.js as the recommended way to execute the actor. This script is not included in the skill's file list, making it an unverifiable external dependency.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 06:42 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — finding-restaurant-brands-on-instagram