finding-software-engineers-on-twitter
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
customMapFunctioninput parameter accepts a JavaScript function as a string which is subsequently executed by the scraper actors at runtime. This provides a mechanism for arbitrary code execution within the actor's environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute a local file
scripts/run_actor.jsusing Node.js. Since this script is not provided within the skill package, its contents are unverifiable, posing a risk of executing unauthorized code already present in the execution environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of processing untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from Twitter bios and tweets via the Twitter scraper actors (referenced in
SKILL.mdunder the Enrichment and Scoring sections). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack any requirement for boundary markers or delimiters to isolate untrusted Twitter data from the agent's primary instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for shell command execution (
node,curl) and file system writes (via the--outputflag in the suggested CLI commands). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the content retrieved from Twitter before the agent uses it for scoring and summarization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides shell command templates for
curlandnode. If the$TECH_STACKor other parameters are not properly handled, this could lead to command injection vulnerabilities where a malicious user or indirect prompt could manipulate the shell execution.
Audit Metadata