finding-tiktok-shop-trending-products
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes a
customMapFunctionparameter that accepts a JavaScript function as a string to transform output data. This functionality allows for arbitrary code execution within the data processing pipeline. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides instructions to execute a local Node.js script (
scripts/run_actor.js) to interface with the Apify actor, which involves spawning subprocesses. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external, untrusted content from TikTok.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context from TikTok post captions, metadata, and creator profiles fetched via the
apidojo/tiktok-scraperactor. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or explicit warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the scraped social media content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
curl), run local scripts (node), and perform network requests to the Apify API. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation of the ingested TikTok data before it is scored or presented in the final output format.
Audit Metadata