monitoring-vc-investor-activity-on-twitter
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a
customMapFunctioninput parameter described as a "JavaScript function to transform each output object." Accepting raw code strings for runtime execution is a security risk, as it may allow for arbitrary code execution within the processing environment if not strictly sandboxed. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large amounts of untrusted data from Twitter (tweets, user bios, search results). This creates a vulnerability where malicious instructions embedded in tweets could influence the agent's behavior during the classification or scoring phases.
- Ingestion points: Twitter search results and user metadata fetched via Apify actors (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None specified; the skill does not mention using delimiters or specific instructions to ignore content within the scraped data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (
node), network requests (curl), and file system operations (saving CSV/JSON). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the scraped content is mentioned before it is passed to the scoring and classification logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides multiple examples of shell command execution, including running local Node.js scripts (
scripts/run_actor.js) and usingcurlto interact with the Apify REST API. These commands are used to manage data flow and actor execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from Apify's official API (
api.apify.com) and utilizes specific Apify actors (apidojo/tweet-scraper,apidojo/twitter-user-scraper). These are recognized as well-known service endpoints and vendor-owned resources, representing the intended functionality of the skill.
Audit Metadata