tracking-sports-team-fan-sentiment-twitter
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill defines an input parameter
customMapFunctiondescribed as a "JavaScript function to transform each output object." Accepting executable code as a string input creates a dynamic execution surface that could be exploited if the execution environment is not strictly sandboxed. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from Twitter via a third-party scraper, which can lead to downstream instruction obedience if malicious content is present in the tweets.
- Ingestion points: Scraper results from the
apidojo/tweet-scraperactor (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters to isolate scraped content from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities (via
run_actor.jsflags), network access (viacurl), and subprocess execution (vianode). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is specified for the external data before it is presented to the agent or transformed by the mapping function.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions provide shell commands using
nodeto execute local scripts andcurlto interact with the Apify REST API. These commands are necessary for the skill's operation but represent a capability that requires oversight.
Audit Metadata