lip-sync-spokesperson-video

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to ingest and process untrusted external media, such as face images and audio files, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The generate_lip_sync tool accepts face_image and audio parameters from user-provided data (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the provided media metadata or content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the generate_lip_sync and get_video_generation tools to perform remote video generation tasks.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of the input media files is mentioned to prevent the processing of adversarial instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes a command for setting up the Model Context Protocol (MCP) transport layer, which involves executing a shell command.
  • Evidence: claude mcp add --transport http apimage https://mcp.apimage.org/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer sk_your_api_key" -s user in SKILL.md.
  • Note: This command connects to a service hosted on apimage.org, which is the domain associated with the skill vendor apimageorg.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 12:35 AM