rover
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides commands to fetch installation scripts from
https://rover.apollo.dev/nix/latestandhttps://rover.apollo.dev/win/latest. These are official distribution endpoints for the Apollo Rover toolset. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The provided installation workflow uses shell piping to execute remote content (
curl | shandiwr | iex). This is a high-capability pattern, though documented here for legitimate software setup. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions by fetching and analyzing GraphQL schemas from external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via
rover graph fetch,rover graph introspect, androver subgraph introspect(SKILL.md, references/graphs.md, references/subgraphs.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external schema SDL as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured to use the
Bashtool for running CLI commands and has permissions for reading and writing files (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill lacks validation or sanitization mechanisms to filter malicious instructions potentially embedded in GraphQL schema comments or metadata.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://rover.apollo.dev/nix/latest - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata