Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a runtime monkeypatch of thepypdflibrary. Specifically, it overridesDictionaryObject.get_inheritedto change how the library handles selection list attributes (FA.Opt). While documented as a bug fix, modifying library behavior at runtime is a dynamic execution pattern that requires review. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external PDF files. The workflow involves extracting text and form metadata into JSON formats (
field_info.json,fields.json) which are then analyzed by the agent. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in a PDF could influence the agent's behavior during the extraction or filling process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and script metadata (PEP 723) specify several external dependencies including
pypdf,pdf2image,pdfplumber,pytesseract,Pillow,pandas, andopenpyxl. These are standard packages for PDF and data processing tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute various command-line tools such as
pdftotext,qpdf, andpdftk, as well as Python scripts viauv run. These operations are within the stated scope of a PDF manipulation toolkit.
Audit Metadata