kinetic-launch-film
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on external binaries for media processing and rendering. Several scripts (main.py, narration.py, media.py, timeline.py, and stage.py) execute shell commands via
subprocessandos.system. Of note,scripts/stage_engine/stage.pyusesos.systemwith f-string interpolation to callffmpeg, using paths and filenames defined in thebrief.jsonconfiguration. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if an attacker-controlled configuration file is processed. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to retrieve necessary assets and data from remote services. It fetches SVG icons from
cdn.jsdelivr.net, communicates withapi.openai.comfor narration and image generation, and retrieves brand icon data fromraw.githubusercontent.comandthesvg.org. These operations are consistent with the skill's documented purpose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes configuration and script files (
brief.jsonandvo.txt) that can influence its internal logic and shell command execution. - Ingestion points: Configuration parameters and narration text are read from files within the project directory.
- Boundary markers: None observed; inputs are directly interpolated into templates and commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, manage files, and access the network.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the text and paths before they are used in shell commands.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: unknown (check file) - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata