wiki-ingest

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (PDFs, Web URLs, chat exports, and repositories) which serves as a major ingestion point for malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses the Read tool to ingest local files and WebFetch or defuddle for external URLs.
  • Boundary markers: SKILL.md contains a specific 'Content Trust Boundary' section explicitly instructing the agent to ignore instructions found within source content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to write to the filesystem, execute CLI tools (obsidian-wiki, qmd), and run external Python scripts via shell commands.
  • Sanitization: Instructions emphasize distilling substance and synthesizing knowledge rather than following verbatim text, providing a layer of protection against accidental obedience.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The file references/pageindex.md contains instructions to execute a Python script from an external repository (VectifyAI/PageIndex) using the command uv run --no-project python run_pageindex.py. This executes external code in the agent's environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of CLI tools and shell commands to manage the wiki state:
  • obsidian-wiki is used for cache management, manifest updates, and memory syncing.
  • qmd is used for vector database querying and indexing.
  • defuddle is used for processing web content for clean extraction.
  • Standard utilities like sha256sum, git, and mv are used for file operations and project detection.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's configuration and the PageIndex integration rely on loading .env files, which the instructions in references/pageindex.md note are expected to contain sensitive credentials such as OPENAI_API_KEY.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 10:27 AM