skills/araa47/ez-voice/ez-tts/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ez-tts

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses a sensitive configuration file at ~/.env via the load_env function in scripts/tts.py. This file often contains credentials for various services, and reading it from the home directory constitutes a data exposure risk.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes the ffmpeg CLI tool using subprocess.run to convert WAV files to OGG format. The implementation correctly uses an argument list which mitigates shell injection risks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches AI models from Hugging Face, a well-known service, when TTSModel.load_model() is called. These downloads are necessary for the primary function of the skill.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerable to indirect prompt injection where untrusted text input could influence agent behavior if the output is processed by other skills.
  • Ingestion points: The text argument in scripts/tts.py accepts arbitrary strings for speech generation.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters are used to wrap or isolate the processed text input.
  • Capability inventory: File system writing, subprocess execution (ffmpeg), and network access for model downloads.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is applied to the input text before processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 24, 2026, 02:14 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ez-tts