agent-chief-attention-guard
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's agent registration capability allows defining a
verificationparameter that executes shell commands (e.g.,command:grep -q 'Analysis complete' /tmp/analysis.log). This feature enables the execution of arbitrary system commands as part of the task lifecycle. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs users to install the
agent-chiefpackage usingpiporuv. This introduces a dependency on an external package not hosted by a predefined trusted organization or well-known service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge between untrusted external data (RSS feeds, HTTP API events, monitoring logs) and an LLM-based 'judge' engine. This configuration is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, where malicious payloads in the processed events could attempt to manipulate the routing and decision-making logic.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the
ChiefClient.propose_eventmethod, the resident daemon's local HTTP API endpoint (/v1/events), and various documented integration examples including RSS feeds and CI/CD hooks inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are visible in the provided code snippets or referenced Jinja2 prompt templates to separate user data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution (via the agent verification system), network connectivity (for LLM backends and daemon operations), and file system access (to
~/.chief/). - Sanitization: The skill does not demonstrate explicit sanitization or validation of event content (title, body, metadata) before interpolation into the LLM judge's context.
Audit Metadata