agent-chief-attention-guard

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's agent registration capability allows defining a verification parameter that executes shell commands (e.g., command:grep -q 'Analysis complete' /tmp/analysis.log). This feature enables the execution of arbitrary system commands as part of the task lifecycle.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs users to install the agent-chief package using pip or uv. This introduces a dependency on an external package not hosted by a predefined trusted organization or well-known service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge between untrusted external data (RSS feeds, HTTP API events, monitoring logs) and an LLM-based 'judge' engine. This configuration is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, where malicious payloads in the processed events could attempt to manipulate the routing and decision-making logic.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the ChiefClient.propose_event method, the resident daemon's local HTTP API endpoint (/v1/events), and various documented integration examples including RSS feeds and CI/CD hooks in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are visible in the provided code snippets or referenced Jinja2 prompt templates to separate user data from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution (via the agent verification system), network connectivity (for LLM backends and daemon operations), and file system access (to ~/.chief/).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not demonstrate explicit sanitization or validation of event content (title, body, metadata) before interpolation into the LLM judge's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 15, 2026, 12:35 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-chief-attention-guard