agent-skills-context-engineering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download skill definitions and plugin components from an external, third-party GitHub repository.
- Evidence:
curl -o .claude/skills/context-fundamentals.md https://raw.githubusercontent.com/muratcankoylan/Agent-Skills-for-Context-Engineering/main/skills/context-fundamentals/SKILL.mdinSKILL.md. - Evidence: Plugin marketplace references pointing to
muratcankoylan/Agent-Skills-for-Context-EngineeringinSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains logic patterns for ingesting and processing untrusted external data (messages, tasks, responses), which establishes an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested via the
messageslist in functions likecompress_with_summaryandorganize_context, thetaskparameter inOrchestratorAgent.process_task, and theresponsestring inscore_response(all inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The provided code examples typically use simple f-string interpolation (e.g.,
f"Summarize these messages concisely:\n{to_compress}") without clear delimiters or instructions to disregard embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill demonstrates capabilities for file system access (
Path,open), network communication (requests,anthropic), and external tool execution via Modal inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No explicit content sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is present for data being interpolated into agent prompts.
Audit Metadata