agent-sprite-forge-2d-game-assets
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions require cloning a repository from an unverified source (
https://github.com/0x0funky/agent-sprite-forge.git) and installing its dependencies. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands during installation (
git clone,pip install) to fetch and set up an external codebase from an unknown repository, which could execute arbitrary code during the environment setup. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted user prompts and reference images to generate assets and write files (images, JSON metadata, and engine-specific scripts) to the local file system.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the
promptandreference_imageparameters in theSpriteGeneratorandMapGeneratorclasses (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions to delimit untrusted data from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file system writes (generating PNG, GIF, JSON, .tscn Godot scenes, .res resources, and .gd scripts) and makes network calls to the OpenAI API.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input prompts or reference image content before they are used in file generation and API calls.
Audit Metadata