agentic-research-agent-deeplearning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to direct prompt injection. The research prompt provided by the user is interpolated directly into system and user messages for the AI agents in
src/planning_agent.pyandsrc/agents.py. This allows a user to potentially bypass or override the agent's research logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted user input enters the agent context through the
promptfield in the/generate_reportendpoint defined inmain.py. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions used to isolate the user-provided prompt from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to perform network requests to external APIs (Tavily, arXiv) and perform read/write operations on a PostgreSQL database.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is applied to the user input before it is passed to the LLM.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's documentation and code (specifically
main.py) use hardcoded default credentials (postgresql://app:local@...) and default environment variable values for the database. While these are for a local development environment, hardcoded credentials represent a security best-practice violation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions include cloning a repository from DeepLearning.AI's official GitHub organization. This is a reference to a well-known source and is documented as part of the setup process.
Audit Metadata