all-agentic-architectures
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation of the
calculatortool inSKILL.mduses the Pythoneval()function to process input strings. This is a significant security risk as it allows for the execution of arbitrary Python code if the agent is provided with a malicious expression. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The troubleshooting section of
SKILL.mdincludes therun_notebookfunction, which usesnbconvert.preprocessors.ExecutePreprocessorto programmatically execute all code cells within a Jupyter notebook. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup instructions direct users to clone an external repository from GitHub (
github.com/FareedKhan-dev/all-agentic-architectures.git). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The architectural patterns in
SKILL.mdcreate a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through parameters such as
user_input,task, andproblemacross multiple patterns includingReflectionState,MultiAgentState, andToTState. - Boundary markers: Prompt templates do not use delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded instructions within processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides high-risk capabilities, including
eval()-based code execution, notebook execution, and network-enabled search tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering before untrusted content is interpolated into agent prompts.
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