tradingagents-astock-multi-agent-framework
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone and install code from a personal GitHub repository (
simonlin1212/tradingagents-astock) which is not associated with a recognized organization. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Installation involves running
pip install -e .on a repository from an unverified source. This can result in the execution of arbitrary code via the package's setup scripts (e.g.,setup.py) during the installation process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework facilitates the execution of shell commands for its core functionality, including git operations and custom CLI entry points like
tradingagentsandtradingagents-web. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting unstructured data from external news feeds (CLS.cn, EastMoney, Sina) and social sentiment sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through tools such as
get_news,get_social_sentiment, andget_global_newsacross various analyst files. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested financial content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, as the agents generate trading signals (BUY/SELL) and execution plans which are used for portfolio management decisions.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is interpolated into the analyst agents' prompts.
Audit Metadata