tradingagents-astock-multi-agent-framework

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone and install code from a personal GitHub repository (simonlin1212/tradingagents-astock) which is not associated with a recognized organization.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Installation involves running pip install -e . on a repository from an unverified source. This can result in the execution of arbitrary code via the package's setup scripts (e.g., setup.py) during the installation process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework facilitates the execution of shell commands for its core functionality, including git operations and custom CLI entry points like tradingagents and tradingagents-web.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting unstructured data from external news feeds (CLS.cn, EastMoney, Sina) and social sentiment sources.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through tools such as get_news, get_social_sentiment, and get_global_news across various analyst files.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested financial content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, as the agents generate trading signals (BUY/SELL) and execution plans which are used for portfolio management decisions.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is interpolated into the analyst agents' prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 14, 2026, 05:59 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tradingagents-astock-multi-agent-framework