arcads-claude-code
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches source code and project files from a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/krusemediallc/arcads-claude-code.git) that is not associated with the skill author or a trusted organization.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructs the user to run a local setup script (
./scripts/setup.sh) and install dependencies from a requirements file (shared/skills/meta-ad-builder/scripts/requirements.txt) provided by the untrusted external repository. This pattern provides a direct path for the execution of unverified third-party code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses
subprocess.runto execute system-level commands includingffmpeg,npx(hyperframes), andwhisper. These calls use parameters derived from user-controlled data (such as file paths and output names), which presents a risk of command injection if not rigorously sanitized. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses local image and video files to convert them into Base64 strings for transmission to the external API
api.arcads.ai. While this is part of the skill's stated functionality, it establishes a data exfiltration vector for local assets. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted external data that influences high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Ingests user-provided advertising prompts, scripts, and dialogue strings within
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: Spawns subprocesses, performs file system writes, and executes network operations.
- Sanitization: Absent. The skill lacks evidence of input validation or escaping before data is passed to subprocesses or API payloads.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata