claude-code-academic-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone a repository from an unverified third-party GitHub account (
pedrohcgs/claude-code-my-workflow). This introduces external scripts that are not from a verified vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on executing local shell scripts provided in the external repository, specifically
./scripts/validate-setup.shand./scripts/save-context-snapshot.sh. It also executes various CLI tools includingxelatex,Rscript,quarto,git, andgh. The documentation also suggests the use ofsudo fc-cache -fvfor font management, which involves elevated system privileges. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted research manuscripts, R scripts, and Quarto documents while possessing execution capabilities. Ingestion points: Processes user-provided
.tex,.R,.qmd, and.yamlfiles. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to prevent the model from following malicious commands that might be embedded within the documents being analyzed. Capability inventory: Access to the shell, document compilers, statistical software (R), and version control systems. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or content validation for the external files processed by the skill.
Audit Metadata