claude-code-design-ai
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone a repository from an unverified personal GitHub account (
mikesheehan54). - Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/mikesheehan54/Claude-Code-Design-AI.gitinSKILL.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves running
npm install, which executes code from the downloaded repository and its dependencies. - Evidence:
npm installfollowing thegit clonecommand inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides CLI commands for converting files and generating systems, which involve executing local scripts with user-supplied paths.
- Evidence:
npx claude-design convert ./design.png --output ./componentsinSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it processes untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts image URLs (
imageUrl) and Figma file keys (fileKey) as input inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded content in images or design files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network operations via the Anthropic and Figma APIs and write files to the local filesystem using
ShadcnExporter.writeToFile. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input content (e.g., OCR text from screenshots) is documented before it is passed to the AI model.
Audit Metadata